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Abstract—Today, money laundering poses a serious threat not 
only to financial institutions but also to the nation. This 
criminal activity is becoming more and more sophisticated and 
seems to have moved from the cliché of drug trafficking to 
financing terrorism and surely not forgetting personal gain. 
Most international financial institutions have been 
implementing anti-money laundering solutions to fight 
investment fraud. However, traditional investigative 
techniques consume numerous man-hours. Recently, data 
mining approaches have been developed and are considered as 
well-suited techniques for detecting money laundering 
activities. Within the scope of a collaboration project for the 
purpose of developing a new solution for the anti-money 
laundering Units in an international investment bank, we 
proposed a simple and efficient data mining-based solution for 
anti-money laundering. In this paper, we present this solution 
developed as a tool and show some preliminary experiment 
results with real transaction datasets. 
Keywords-data mining; anti-money laundering; clustering; 
neural networks 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Money laundering (ML) is a process to make illegitimate 
income appear legitimate; this is also the process by which 
criminals attempt to conceal the true origin and ownership of 
the proceeds of their criminal activity. ML has been defined 
by Genzman as an activity that "knowingly engage in a 
financial transaction with the proceeds of some unlawful 
activity with the intent of promoting or carrying on that 
unlawful activity or to conceal or disguise the nature 
location, source, ownership, or control of these proceeds" 
[1]. Through money laundering, criminals try to convert 
monetary proceeds derived from illicit activities into “clean” 
funds using a legal medium such as large investment or 
pension funds hosted in retail or investment banks.  This type 
of criminal activity is getting more and more sophisticated 
and seems to have moved from the cliché of drug trafficking 
to financing terrorism and surely not forgetting personal 
gain. Today, ML is the third largest “Business” in the world 
following the Currency Exchange and the Automobile 
Industry. According to the United Nations Office on Drug 
and Crime, the worldwide value of laundered money in one 
year ranges from $500 billion to $1 trillion [2] and from this 
approximately $400-450 billion is associated with drug 
trafficking. The rest is from other forms of organised crime 
such as fraud, robbery, forgery & counterfeiting, blackmail, 
extortion and terrorist activity. These figures are at times 
modest and are partially fabricated using statistical models, 
as nobody exactly knows the true value of money 
laundering, one can only forecast according to the fraud that 
has already been exposed. Nowadays, it poses a serious 
threat not only to financial institutions but also to the nation. 
Some risks faced by financial institutions can be listed as 
reputation risk, operational risk, concentration risk and legal 
risk. At the society level, ML could provide the fuel for drug 
dealers, terrorists, arms dealers and other criminals to operate 
and expand their criminal enterprises. Briefly, nations care 
about ML because they care about their political and 
economic stability. Hence, the governments, financial 
regulators require financial institutions to implement 
processes and procedures to prevent/detect money 
laundering as well as the financing of terrorism and other 
illicit activities that money launderers are involved in. 
Therefore, anti-money laundering (AML) is of critical 
significance to national financial stability and international 
security.  
Traditional approaches to AML followed a labour-
intensive manual approach because ML is a sophisticated 
activity with many way of laundering money. These 
approaches can be classified into the identification of money 
laundering incidences, detection, avoidance and surveillance 
of money laundering activities [3]. Indeed, given that the 
volume of banking data and transactions have increased in 
number of ways, such approaches need to be supported by 
automated tools for detecting money laundering’s pattern. 
Meanwhile, AML software tools in the market are normally 
rule-based that make the decisions using some sets of 
predefined rules and thresholds based on mean and standard 
deviation values. 
Besides, data mining techniques (DM) [4] have been 
proven to be well suited for identifying trends and patterns in 
large datasets. Therefore, DM techniques are expected to be 
applied successfully in the area of AML. Nevertheless, there 
is still little research concerning this bias especially a DM 
framework/solution for supporting AML experts in their 
daily tasks. Recently, there are some AML approaches based 
on DM that have been proposed and discussed in literature. 
Most of these approaches try to recognize ML patterns by 
different techniques such as support vector machine [5], 
correlation analysis [6], histogram analysis [6], etc. They aim 
to provide techniques for detecting a variety of ML by 
exploring a massive dimensionality of datasets including 
customers x accounts x products x geography x time. 
However, these approaches are more or less appropriate for 
the cash world and not scaled well for investment activities 
due to the lack of good methods in choosing parameters and 
they still have performance issues. In our recent work 
[7][8][16], we proposed a method to identify customers and 
analysed important parameters linked to ML patterns in an 
international investment bank. Customer behaviour in 
investment activities is complicated because it is influenced 
by many factors. We also show that by choosing suitable 
parameters, simple DM techniques can be applied together to 
detect suspicious ML cases in investment activities. In this 
paper, we present a DM framework that bases on a 
combination of clustering and classification techniques for 
analysing transaction datasets to detect these cases. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section II 
deals with recent works on this subject. Section III resumes 
our DM framework for detecting money-laundering 
activities. We present our approach for analysing transaction 
datasets in Section IV. Experiment results of this approach 
are presented and discussed in Section V. Finally, we 
conclude in Section VI. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
[6] applied a discretisation process on their datasets to 
build clusters. They map their feature space “customer x time 
x transaction” to n+2 dimensional Euclide space: n customer 
dimensions, 1 time dimension and 1 transaction dimension. 
They firstly discretise the whole timeline into difference time 
instances. Hence, each transaction is viewed as a node in 
one-dimensional timeline space. They project all transactions 
of customers to the timeline axis by accumulating 
transactions and transaction frequency to form a histogram. 
They create clusters based on segments in the histogram. A 
local and a global correlation analysing are then applied to 
detect suspicious patterns. This approach improves firstly the 
complexity by reducing the clustering problem to a 
segmentation problem [9]. Furthermore, it is more or less 
appropriate for analysing individual behaviours or group 
behaviours by their transactions to detect suspicious 
behaviours related to “abnormal” hills in their histogram. 
However, as we have to analyse many customers with many 
transactions with a variety of amounts for a long period, it is 
difficult to detect suspicious cases, as there are very few or 
no “peak hills” in the histogram. Firstly, another global 
analysis is needed and we can then apply this method for 
further analysis in this case. 
Another approach for AML is using support vector 
machine (SVM) [10]. In [11], authors propose an extension 
of SVM to detect unusual customer behaviour. They present 
a combination of an improved RBF kernel [12] with the 
definition of distinct distant [13] and 
supervised/unsupervised SVM algorithms (C-SVM, one-
class SVM). One-class SVM [10] is an unsupervised 
learning approach used to detect outliers based on unlabeled 
training datasets which is highly suitable for ML training 
sets. The advantage of this approach is that it can deal with 
heterogeneous datasets. However, there is a performance 
issue due to the lack of parameter selection. 
III. DATA MINING FRAMEWORK FOR AML 
A framework for detecting ML activities is normally 
consisted of four layers [14][15] corresponding to four levels 
of analysis: transaction, account, institution and multi-
institution. The first three levels: transaction, account and 
institution are the most important where the last one depends 
more or less on the organisations and their policy. Our DM 
framework also includes these three levels and is consist of 
different components as shown in the Fig.1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  DM Architecture for detecting AML. 
A. Data Pre-Processing 
The main role of this component is to extract and clean 
raw datasets from data sources located in different sites of 
this international bank. It then integrates them into 
consolidated databases that are used to build a data 
warehouse of customer information and customer 
transactions. One of the most challenges in this step is the 
data quality issue. In banking and finance, datasets has a 
different set of quality problems at the instance level and in 
our case, most of these problems relate to customer 
information. Some of them can be listed as:  
• missing values, dummy values or null. This 
occurs in most of the data fields in all databases 
analysed except the customer identification 
(ID), the customer type (corporate, individual 
and joint) and the fund name;  
• misspellings, usually typos and phonetic errors. 
Furthermore, banking datasets are normally managed in 
distributed way for the flexibility and security reasons. The 
independence and heterogeneity of each data source can also 
be data quality issues especially when an integrating task is 
required, as all conflicts must be solved. Some basic data 
quality issues are solved by this pre-processing component. 
Other issues related to customer information are 
implemented in customer identification module [7] 
integrated in our knowledge management component. 
Data quality issue related to customer transactions is 
normally at the logic level, e.g. the mapping error where 
transactions of a customer are copy from one system to 
another system and sometimes not all of transactions are 
copied. Consequently, we do not have a whole picture of his 
transactions but its snapshot. 
B. Data Mining 
This component provides classification and clustering 
techniques for the most basic level of this framework: 
analysing transaction datasets. At this level, transaction 
records are extracted for investigations. However, they have 
a few analytical contexts because they do not provide links to 
accounts or other data. In the second level, multiple 
transactions are associated with specific accounts. 
Aggregation of transactions with individual accounts gives a 
general view of these accounts about their financial activity. 
In our approach, customer behaviours have been detected by 
mining techniques such as: clustering that groups similar 
transactions and builds suspicious profiles; classification that 
classify customers into pre-defined categories of risk. Details 
on these techniques will be found Section IV. 
C. Knowledge Management 
Results of mining process, experience of AML experts, 
running results are collected, stored in relevant repositories 
and analysed by this component. It also generates significant, 
interpretable rules and knowledge. This component controls 
all the data mining process by proposing different strategies 
mining as well as for integrating and coordinating to achieve 
the better performance. For example, it integrates clustering 
results and learning results to build a decision tree for 
detecting suspicious case. Its architecture also allows to 
share knowledge to other systems with regards to their 
privacy policy. 
IV. TRANSACTION MONITORING 
In this section, we present our solution for analysing 
investment transactions. This solution is implemented in the 
data mining and knowledge components of our framework. 
As mentioned above, transactions and accounts cannot be 
separately investigated; they should be aggregated to give a 
general view of customers’ behaviour. Normally, this 
analysis is based on two important characteristics: frequency 
of transactions and the value of each transaction.  
Current solutions apply these two characteristics in a set 
of rules to detect suspicious cases. Most of the vendor 
software approaches found in the market are based on a 
decision tree using frequency and value of transactions as a 
marker, the thresholds for these markers are based on 
averages and the standard deviation. This approach only uses 
one-way comparison i.e. customer X’s behaviour against 
customer X’s previous “normal” behaviour. This approach is 
reasonably adequate for the cash world (accounts). However, 
they are not efficient for the investment market because there 
are many factors that influence the frequency of trades in 
investment banking such as political environment, market 
climate, fund prices, currency exchange rates, etc. [8] also 
give an example of the variety of transaction frequencies that 
exists among different investment funds. 
Briefly, an efficient solution to investigate ML in 
investment banking is to determine relevant parameters to 
decrease the number of dimensions (attributes) and to 
improve   performance. In our recent work [8], by analysing 
customer transactions, we proposed parameters that were 
used in detecting suspicious cases. Concretely, we defined 
two parameters: Δ1, the proportion between the redemption 
value and the subscription value conditional on time (daily, 
weekly, monthly etc) and Δ2, the proportion between a 
specific redemption value and the total value of the 
investors’ shares conditional on time as below: 
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where αi  is the subscription value and αi  ∈ [0…+∞], βi is 
the redemption value and βi  ∈ (0…+∞], θi is the value of the 
investors shares and θi ∈ [0…+∞], τi  is time and τi ∈ [Day, 
Week, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months or 12 months] 
depending on the investigating level (by day, by week, etc.). 
Note that the value of the transactions (subscription or 
redemption) of each investor in an investment fund is 
aggregated by time: daily, weekly, monthly, 3 monthly, 6-
monthly and yearly, for example αi is the subscription value 
of the day τi if the investigating level is by day. Another 
example is shown in the Table I, in week 30, investor A01 
had a total subscription of $100 and had a total redemption 
of $90. His Δ1 and Δ2 are 0.9 and 0.82 respectively. 
Through the evaluation of these parameters on real 
transaction datasets, we recognise that the parameter Δ1 
reflects only the relationship between subscription and 
redemption amount on the time when these activities 
happen, i.e. subscriptions and redemptions are carried out in 
the same day or in the same week, etc. Besides, from the 
AML experts' experience, the relevant subscriptions of a 
redemption activity in suspicious cases are normally not 
only in the current investigation term (week, month...) but 
also in its short previous term (two, three weeks or two three 
month ago). 
For example, a redemption is carried out today and its 
related subscriptions could be carried out in the last few 
days, and then if we consider these two activities together, it 
would be a suspicious case. 
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TABLE I.  AN EXAMPLE OF Δ1 AND Δ2 OF INVESTORS IN FUND A BY 
WEEK 
ID Time Suba Redb 
Values 
of the 
investor 
shares 
Δ1 Δ2 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
A01 Week 30 100 90 110 0.9 0.82 
A02 Week 30 50 20 300 0.4 0.06 
A01 Week 33 100 90 120 0.9 0.75 
A02 Week 37 100 80 380 0.8 0.21 
A03 Week 37 500 400 900 0.8 0.44 
A04 Week 50 700 300 1500 0.43 0.2 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
a. Subscription, b. Redemption 
In order to tackle this problem, we refine the definition of 
Δ1 as below: 
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where αl = max (αi): i∈[j-k, j], ∀j>=k, αi is the 
subscription value and αi  ∈ [0…+∞], βj is the redemption 
value and βj  ∈ (0…+∞], τj  is time as in the definition (1). 
Moreover, The parameter k can be chosen by AML experts. 
It normally varies from 3 to 5. For instance, in the Table I, Δ1 
of the customer A01 at Week 33 is not the proportion 
between the redemption value and the subscription value in 
Week 33 but now is the maximum of subscription values 
from Week 30 to Week 33 (k = 3 in this case).  
Fig.2 shows the whole AML process of our approach. In 
the next step (Fig.2: step (4)), we apply a clustering 
technique for each Δ1 and Δ2 at two levels: fund and investor. 
A centre-based technique is chosen because the shape of 
cluster (convex) does not really affect on the final decision. 
There are two types clustering: one is carried out on the 
whole datasets and another on a suspicious screening of 
datasets depending on the datasets size. The reason is that if 
the datasets size is large, the first clustering type includes a 
repetitiveness of a clustering algorithm on transaction 
datasets to determine the suspicious group. This is a time-
consuming step. We need, moreover, interaction with AML 
experts at each loop of this stage. Consequently, this step 
affects the overall performance of our solution in the term of 
running time.  
Fig.3, for instance, shows four clusters of fund SK 1 
datasets (~70000 elements) based on two variables Δ1 and Δ2 
                                                           
1 Real name of fund can not be disclosed because of confidential 
agreement of the project 
after the first running of a centre-based clustering algorithm. 
Generally, the most suspicious cases should obtain high 
values in Δ1 and Δ2. In this example, Cluster 3 contains not 
only elements with high values in Δ1 and Δ2 but also the 
elements with low values in Δ2. Hence, this clustering 
algorithm is required to perform several times on this cluster 
1 and its subsets to determine the suspicious group. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  AML analysing and investigating process. 
 
Figure 3.  Clustering of fund SK datasets based on Δ1 and Δ2(day). 
Suspicious screening process (Fig.2: step (3)) allows us 
to choose the most relevant subset of whole datasets and 
moreover we only need to perform the clustering algorithm 
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the set of transactions datasets aggregated by Δ1 and Δ2: 
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and this process tries to find a relevant subset V’⊂ V, V’ 
is formally defined as:  
 
V’ = {vi (Δ1i,Δ2i)∈ V ⎜s ≤ Δ1i ≤ 1∧ S ≤ Δ2i ≤1, s, S ∈ R ∧ s 
∈ [0..1] ∧ S ∈ [0..1]} 
 
More details of this process can be found in [16]. Fig. 4, 
for example shows the clustering results of V' from the 
datasets V of the fund SK where s = S = 0.4.  
These outputs will be then fed into a neural network 
(back propagation based) for training on suspicious and non-
suspicious cases. We build also a decision tree on training 
results conditional on time (Fig.2: step (5)). Knowledge are 
then stored in a knowledge repository that assists the AML 
experts making a decision (Fig.2: step (6)). The rest of the 
transaction monitoring process can be resumed as following: 
in order to investigate one case, its transactions are firstly 
placed in a suitable period level (day, week, month, etc., 
Fig.2: step (7)). At the time t on the day d, an AML expert 
investigates the customer X's transactions then its Δ1, Δ2 of 
this day d and its relevant Δ1, Δ2 in this period are calculated. 
For example, if the choosing period is "month" then (Δ1, 
Δ2)day of the day d and (Δ1, Δ2)week, (Δ1, Δ2 )month  for the week 
and the month respectively that contain d are also calculated.  
Next, these parameters will be fed in a trained neural 
network (Fig.2: step (8)) to determine the suspicious degree 
of each level i.e. at the day level, the week level and the 
month level as in the previous example. AML expert uses 
these suspicious degrees to determine suspicious cases and 
carries out further investigation (e.g. redemption type, 
nationality, country of residence, etc.) on these cases (Fig.2: 
(10)). 
 
 
Figure 4.  Clustering of Fund SK datasets based on Δ1 and Δ2(day)  
where s = S= 0.4. 
V. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS 
We evaluate our approach using transactions from funds 
administered by BEP bank2  with two millions transaction 
records. The testing environment is Windows XP with 2Gb 
RAM, 3.4GhZ Intel Dual Core and .NET platform. 
Transaction datasets are divided into two groups according to 
two kinds of investors: individual and corporate because they 
are relatively different in their investment behaviour.  
Another filtering on our datasets is the mapping error 
cleaning as we mentioned in Section III.A. Besides, the 
parameters set up for training neural networks are: training 
cycles = 5000, learning rate = 0.25, number of layers = 3.  
Fig.4, Fig.5 and Fig.6 show the clustering results of the 
fund SK based on Δ1 and Δ2 by day, by week and by month 
respectively and clustering times is variety from 0.1s to 0.3s. 
By observing these results, we recognise that elements in 
Cluster4 (Fig.4), Cluster2 (Fig.5) and Cluster4 (Fig.6) are 
obtained high value in Δ1 and Δ2 and their values will be used 
as suspicious cases.  
 
Figure 5.  Clustering of Fund SK datasets based on Δ1 and Δ2(week). 
 
Figure 6.  Clustering of Fund SK datasets based on Δ1 and Δ2(month). 
                                                           
2 Real name of the bank can not be disclosed because of confidential 
agreement of the project 
Experience of training for the fund SK for corporate 
customers is shown in the Table II.  
TABLE II.  EXPERIENCE OF TRAINING SUSPICIOUS CASES OF THE FUND SK 
FOR CORPORATE CUSTOMERS 
Period 
Number of 
suspicious 
records 
Number of 
unsuspicious 
records 
Training time in 
total 
Day 7 2000 28s 482ms 
Week 47 2000 32s 151ms 
Month 179 2000 32s 918ms 
 
In this case, we take 100% of suspicious cases (obtained 
high value in (Δ1, Δ2) and returned by the clustering process) 
for training. In the unsuspicious case, we take from 5% to 
10% of population for training. Table III shows some 
examples of suspicious degree detected by our neural 
networks. Total running time for this process is ~ 0.51 
second for ~45000 records. Besides, the third case in the 
Table III can be explained as on 31/05/00 the customer 3310 
redeems an amount of 97% of his subscription in a the last 
few days and this amount is moreover about 80% of his total 
values of shares. This case is clearly a suspicious case. These 
suspicious cases are then investigated further and most of 
them have exchange transactions i.e. one can redeem his/her 
entire share from one sub-fund and invest into another sub 
fund. Both two sub-funds are in the same investment fund. 
After the refinement process, the real suspicious cases were 
approximate 5. This is consistent with reports from BEP’s 
bank by using a manual approach that takes more than a 
week to detect. 
TABLE III.  EXPERIENCE OF INVESTIGATING SUSPICIOUS CASES OF THE 
FUND SK FOR CORPORATE CUSTOMERS 
CID Date Δ1; Δ2(day) Suspicious degree 
515 21/09/99 0.98;0.83 0.99 
1074 22/01/01 0.0019;0.01 0.00072 
3310 31/05/00 0.9732;0.79 0.99 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
In this paper, we have presented a DM solution for 
analysing transactions in an investment bank to detect ML. 
In our approach, we determined first of all, the important 
factors for investigating ML in the investment activities. 
Next, we proposed an investigating process based on 
clustering and neural network to detect suspicious cases in 
the context of ML. We also applied heuristics such as 
suspicious screening to improve the running time. From our 
experimental results obtained on the greatest fund of BEP’s 
transaction datasets, we can conclude that our approach is 
promising and it satisfies the needs of the AML unit. It can 
also improve significantly the performance from our 
previous solution in terms of running time. 
Experimental results on real-platforms of BEP for all 
transaction datasets are also being produced and these will 
allow us to test and evaluate the robustness of our approach. 
We are currently working on improving the learning process 
to tackle the problem of very large datasets. 
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